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Abstract
We present and examine a result related to uncer-
tainty reasoning, namely that a certain plausibility
space of Cox’s type can be uniquely embedded in a
minimal ordered field. This, although a purely math-
ematical result, can be claimed to imply that every
rational method to reason with uncertainty must be
based on sets of extended probability distributions,
where extended probability is standard probability ex-
tended with infinitesimals.
This claim must be supported by some argumentation
of non-mathematical type, however, since pure math-
ematics does not tell us anything about the world. We
propose one such argumentation, and relate it to re-
sults from the literature of uncertainty and statistics.
In an added retrospective section we discuss some de-
velopments in the area regarding countable additivity,
partially ordered domains and robustness, and philo-
sophical stances on the Cox/Jaynes approach since
2003. We also show that the most general partially
ordered plausibility calculus embeddable in a ring can
be represented as a set of extended probability distri-
butions or, in algebraic terms, is a subdirect sum of
ordered fields. In other words, the robust Bayesian
approach is universal. This result is exemplified by
relating Dempster-Shafer’s evidence theory to robust
Bayesian analysis.
Keywords. belief, plausibility, probability,
Bayesianism
1 Introduction
We consider plausibility spaces of the type defined by
Cox[13], with auxiliary functions F , S and G used for
computing plausibilities of conjunctions, complements
and disjunctions, respectively. The domain of plausi-
bility values with the auxiliary functions and some or-
dering relation ≤ is called a plausibility space1, where
a ≤ b means that an event with plausibility value a
is equally or less plausible than one with the value b.
A system of conditional propositions or events with
plausibility values is a plausibility model 2. Standard
probability is one possible plausibility space, where
the domain is the real numbers in [0, 1] and the func-
tions F and G are multiplication and addition, respec-
tively. Extended probability is standard probability
extended with infinitesimal probabilities.
We will motivate a definition, prove two theorems and
justify a claim. Definition 1 below of proper ordered
plausibility spaces and models lists a number of prop-
erties we assume for the domain of plausibility values
and the combination functions F and G used to find
plausibilities of conjunctions and disjunctions when
we have the plausibilities of their operands. These
properties are similar to those assumed by Acze´l and
Cox. In particular, F and G satisfy the algebraic laws
of the operators × and + of a ring and have certain
monotonicity properties.
Theorem 1 says that a proper ordered plausibility
space can be embedded in an ordered field where the
field operators× and + are extensions of F andG. An
ordered field is a ring where certain monotonicity and
solvability properties hold, the best known examples
being the fields of realsR and rationalsQ . But there
are more complex ordered fields that may be relevant
and which we will discuss.
In order to motivate Definition 1, we investigate sev-
eral assumptions, some old and some new, which state
desirable properties of a plausibility space. We argue
for the acceptance of a number of these assumptions,
which we call Sufficiency, Monotonicity, Propositional
limit, Refinability and Closedness.
1We use the term space instead of measure or algebra
in order to avoid confusion with terminology in related
work.
2Model is one of several possible terms; it suggests the
analoguous use of models in logic.
Theorem 2 says that a plausibility space satisfying
the above assumptions is a proper ordered plausibility
space as defined in Definition 1. Our claim is:
Claim 1 Theorems 1 and 2 imply that the most gen-
eral rational way to deal with uncertainty, under the
assumptions made, is the Extended Bayes’ method,
where uncertainty is completely described with an ex-
tended probability distribution. With the additional
Robustness assumption, uncertainty is completely de-
scribed with a set of such distributions.
There are many results of the type above in the
20th century literature on probability and uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, there is no consensus among re-
searchers in uncertainty management that Claim 1
is even approximately valid. The Claim is of ob-
vious interest as a foundational issue. But interest
is not confined to the ivory tower: Designers of fu-
ture complex systems that need new types of human-
agent and agent-agent interactions struggle with this
question, and fielded solutions have already unraveled
difficult compatibility problems, e.g., when advanced
system components using different, sometimes incom-
patible, unknown or irrational ways to describe uncer-
tainty are put together to form systems of systems. If
Claim 1 above can be accepted, this task becomes eas-
ier, since questions can center around requirements on
useful probability models rather than comparing dis-
parate schemes of uncertainty management.
The auxiliary argumentation required to support our
claims is similar to inference principles in statis-
tics, like the Sufficiency, Likelihood and Condition-
ality principles[39]. Such principles have only a prag-
matic validity, meaning that their acceptability may
be questioned in new applications different from those
conceived when they were first accepted. We will state
a number of assumptions made in derivations of this
kind, and they are indicated in bold face. Those that
will eventually be retained in this study are marked
with an asterisk (*).
In section 2 we review the basic features of plausi-
bility spaces and state a number of common assump-
tions used to analyze them. In section 3 we review
the two basic methods used to derive probability as
canonical uncertainty measure, coherence arguments
and Cox consistency based argument. In section 4 we
discuss a number of fundamental principles that are
also required but which are often hastily glossed over:
these principles have the common feature that they
say that inferences possible should not depend in an
arbitrary manner on how our problem is embedded in
a larger context. This discussion leads to Definition 1.
The consequences of Theorem 1 are discussed in sec-
tion 5. In section 6 we discuss extended probability.
Theorems are proved in the appendix. The scientific
contribution claimed is the concept of embeddabil-
ity of the auxiliary functions in an ordered field, and
its proofs. These are somewhat more complex than
we hoped, mainly because the function G is a partial
function on the domain of plausibility values.
There are two papers that analyze a similar question
and lead to different but related and compatible con-
clusions, namely Kraft et al[27] and Hardy[22].
2 Symbols and Plausibilities.
The methods of definition and induction are at-
tributed, by Aristotle, to Socrates[46], and were de-
veloped further by Aristotle and the Stoic philoso-
phers. Although present English translations of Aris-
totle contain words like symbol, utility and probabil-
ity, it is clear that Aristotle was not very interested in
mathematics and does not give quantitative models
of decision problems. So his terms do not reflect a de-
tailed and precise understanding of modern Bayesian
decision theory. In particular, the modern concept
of probability was certainly not known at the time.
Nevertheless, Aristotle is the first to give a surviving
qualitative version of the Bayesian decision making
principle in his Nichomachean ethics[24]: “ Find out
what you think is a good life, and consider the proba-
bilities of your possible actions to achieve this. Then
follow the course of action which with highest proba-
bibility results in a good life.”
Two thousand years later, Thomas Bayes was the first
to apply the newly invented probability calculus to an
inference problem. In his posthumous essay he com-
putes the posterior probability for the probability of
heads in tossing a coin, with respect to observed out-
comes and under the assumption that tosses are in-
dependent and identically distributed, and that the
prior probability of getting a head is uniformly dis-
tributed between 0 and 1. Somewhat later, Laplace
gave a more satisfactory analysis of the Bayesian
method.
Our modern plausibility models assume a set of
events, or statements, or possible world sets A, B,
C, etc., which in an application will correspond to
conditions existing in the world or in the minds of hu-
mans and agents. This step is completely standard.
Many theories of plausibility go on to define condi-
tional event plausibilities, which in many cases are
written using the probability inspired notation A|B
- the plausibility of A given that we know B to be
true3. This is the model in which foundational stud-
3A|B is thus the plausibility, not the conditional event.
It is sometimes written pl(A|B)
ies are usually made, and which we use here.
There are essentially two different methods that were
used to analyse possible plausibility spaces for con-
sistency. The more common is based on a gambling
analogy: plausibilities are assumed analog to betting
odds, and a situation where a gambler can pick bets
on a set of related events to hedge completely the risk
of loosing money is called incoherent. The plausibility
assignment leading to such a situation is considered
incoherent, and under various assumptions several ar-
guments exist that end up in concluding that proba-
bility or a set of probability distributions is the only
coherent plausibility space [41, 28, 15, 45]. We will
use here the alternative approach devised by Cox[13]
which avoids the betting scenario and instead analy-
ses how plausibilities of combined events can be de-
fined, and what properties the plausibility combina-
tion functions must have in order to avoid that an
events plausibility will depend on which of several pos-
sible derivations is used.
Cox[13] assumes that the domain of plausibility val-
ues is an interval of real values, which without loss
of generality can be assumed to be [0, 1], with 0
for falsity and 1 for truth. He furthermore finds
that two functions F and S must exist such that
A ∧ B|C = F (A|B ∧ C,B|C) and ¬A|C = S(A|C).
With a number of – sometimes implicit – regularity
assumptions, he shows that the domain of plausibil-
ity values can be rescaled so that F is tranformed
to multiplication, and S to the function S such that
S(x) = 1 − x. In other words, if his assumptions
are accepted, plausibility models must be equivalent
to probability models. We can state an assumption
made implicitly by Cox here (the function G was in-
troduced by Acze´l[1] in a related investigation):
Sufficiency assumption*: The plausibility value of
a proposition is a sufficient characterization of the
statement with respect to uncertainty and proposi-
tional connectives, i. e., there are functions F and
S, and a partial function G such that A ∧ B|C =
F (A|BC,B|C), A|C = S(A|C) and A ∨ B|C =
G(A|C,B −A|C).
There has been some concern with alternative inter-
pretations of symbols used. In rough and fuzzy set
theory[37, 51], the meanings of symbols are taken to
be ambiguous, in the sense that even with full infor-
mation we cannot definitely say, e.g., whether or not
A obtains or if x is a member of set X . The ambiguity
problem has in many articles been claimed to be an
obstacle to probabilistic uncertainty management[49].
An alternative way is to see ambiguity as an aspect
that should go into the structure of a probabilistic
model. So instead of introducing A as an objective
fuzzy set, we can introduce the judgments made by
various agents and decision makers as A|Ci for the
judgment made e.g., by agent i based on the informa-
tion and background factors available to agent i. This
makes fuzziness and plausibility orthogonal concepts,
and both can be present in an application. Those who
focus on impreciseness assume that this is the most
prominent characteristic of their applications, while
those focusing on plausibility do not think so.
Which is the domainD of plausibility values? Fine[17,
Ch 1] lists a number of theories, which correspond
to different order structures of the domain of plau-
sibility values. In short, the domain can be discrete
(with true/false as the case equivalent to propositional
logic), ordered, continuous or partially ordered. All
applications of plausibility in real systems aim at de-
cision making, and for this reason we must eventually
be able to say that one event is more plausible than
another one. For this reason it is essential to have
some order structure in the domain, and we rule out
completely unordered domains like the complex num-
bers. This means that the relation ’more plausible
than’ is transitive. This is not necessarily the case in
practical decision making but because of psychologi-
cal effects like framing, unstable preferences or com-
putational limitations of the brain. Our study aims at
prescriptive theories so this problem will be ignored:
the domain of plausibility values is always (at least)
partially ordered and usually linearly ordered.
There are several uncertainty management methods
that make use of partially ordered domains of plausi-
bility values, typically in the form of intervals of real
numbers.
Robustness assumption*: A plausibility space
with a partial order relation on the domain of plau-
sibility values, describing the relation ’more plausible
than’, is definable using indexed sets of plausibility
spaces each having a linearly ordered domain of plau-
sibility values. In such a space, an event e1 is more
plausible than e2 if and only if it is more plausible in
each constituent indexed space.
We have not yet a compelling argument for the ro-
bustness assumption4 – existing proposals have rather
large gaps. A possible approach is to develop a general
theory of partially ordered plausibility spaces. Until
this has been done, we assume robustness and con-
sequently analyze models with a linearly ordered do-
main D of plausibility values.
Monotonicity assumption*: The domain of plau-
sibility is ordered, S is decreasing5, and F and G are
4see however the restrospective section 8.2
5Decreasing is a stronger condition than non-
increasing. The assumption could also have been called
increasing in each argument (in the case of F if the
other argument is non-⊥).
By considering the limiting case of propositional logic
we also find a number of constraints based on the
requirement that reasoning with entirely false or true
events should follow the rules of propositional logic.
We omit a number of rules which will follow from the
algebraic rules of auxiliary functions F and G that we
will soon adopt:
Propositional limit assumption*: G(x,⊥) = x,
F (⊥, x) = ⊥, F (x,⊤) = x, and S(⊥) = ⊤.
An immediate consequence of Monotonicity and
Propositional limit is F (x, y) ≤ min(x, y) and
G(x, y) ≥ max(x, y).
3 Coherence, or Dutch Book
avoidance
We have now stated the common assumptions of most
existing theories of plausibility[17, 15, 13, 41]. But
more is required before probability appears as in-
evitable in a form we recognize. What is required
is some means to derive constraints on sets of plau-
sibilities of different conditional statements. With-
out such constraints we can easily define plausibility
spaces that are not equivalent to probability. There
are basically two ways to proceed. One followed by
de Finetti is to construct a gambling situation where
different plausibilities are tied together in composite
bets offered by a bookmaker according to his beliefs.
A bookmaker who offers a set of bets among which a
gambler can choose a combination which gives posi-
tive payoff in every situation seems to have made his
bets from a globally incoherent set of beliefs. Several
papers show, with important differences in detail, that
every coherent belief set is equivalent to a probability
model[15, 13, 41, 29]. The coherence concept can also
be applied to some domains not totally but partially
ordered, and Goodman, Ngyuen and Rogers[19] show
that some plausibilty measures not coherent under the
total order assumption, among others the standard
version of DS-theory, are coherent under the latter
assumption.
Another way to connect different plausibilities is via
propositional logic connectives, and this gives us
some constraints on the auxiliary functions F , S
and G used in Cox’s approach. As an example, the
rule of associativity for conjunction enforces F to
be associative for certain arguments, namely, from
strict monotonicity. Despite the subtle distinction, the
weaker assumption would lead to completely different
conclusions[14] since non-strict monotonicity does not en-
tail cancellation laws.
ABC|D = F (AB|CD,C|D) = F (A|BCD,BC|D)
and x = A|BCD, y = B|CD and z = C|D, we can
derive
F (x, F (y, z)) = F (F (x, y), z). (1)
In other words, under some circumstances associativ-
ity is inherited by F from the associativity of conjunc-
tion. If we want to show that every good plausibility
space must be rescalable to probability, we must prove
that F and G satisfy certain algebraic laws that are
satisfied by · and + and invariant under rescaling - the
laws of associativity, commutativity and distributiv-
ity satisfied by the operators of a ring. As an example,
a model is discussed by Halpern[20] that has only a
few events. Thus the domain of plausibility values is
finite and associativity and differentiability of F does
not seem inevitable. In order to claim that the aux-
iliary function must be associative, we must either
claim that no sensible person would deny it, which is
difficult, or find some type of argument that goes out-
side the finite example. In [13], it is plainly assumed
(as pointed out in [47]) that the auxiliary function F
has certain regularity properties:
Associativity and differentiability assumption:
The function F is defined on [0, 1]2, and is associa-
tive and twice continously differentiable; the aux-
iliary function S is continuously differentiable and
S(S(x)) = x
The differentiability part is implicit – as was common
when Cox wrote his paper – but is a standard assump-
tion made to justify switching the order of differenti-
ation which occurs in the derivations of [13], and also
in [25].
4 Embeddability, Denseness,
Refinability.
The argumentation reviewed in section 3 must be
complemented by some arguments that bind together
plausibilities of events that are not connected by
propositional identities. In Cox’s work, this is effected
by regularity assumptions: the auxiliary functions F
and S are assumed to be defined on an interval of
real numbers, and obey the associativity and differ-
entiability assumption on this interval. Implicit in
this assumption seems to be the idea that the func-
tions F and S are universal, and every plausibility
problem should be solvable with the same functions
F and S. In the criticisms of Cox’s work, this as-
sumption has either been assumed not to exist[20, 21]
or been ignored[36]. The statistics based derivations
of probability as universal uncertainty measure often
mention similar assumptions, but surprisingly often
these are somewhat glossed over, the main exceptions
being [9, 17, 41, 49]. We make a sketchy review of
some of the assumptions that have been proposed. In
the prevision-based analyses, the first methods were
based on assuming that an arbitrarily fine partitioning
of the events space exists; this allows one to deduce
the existence of a probability measure based on a re-
lation ≤ on events with the meaning A ≤ B if A is
equally or less plausible than B.
Uniform partition assumption[15]: For every
event B, and every number n, there is a partition
of B into n equally plausible events.
Almost uniform partition assumption[41, Ch 3]:
For every event B, and every number n, there is a par-
tition of B into n events, such that for r = 1, . . . , n−1,
the union of any r elements of the partition is less
plausible than the union of r + 1 members.
Standard events and precise measurements
assumptions[9, Ch. 2.3, Ax. 4,5]: For every con-
ditional event there exists a standard event with the
same plausibility, and for every number r ∈ [0, 1] there
is a standard event with probability r.
Embeddability assumption[49]: Inference should
not depend on how the events participating in cal-
culations are embedded in a larger event plausibility
system.
An alternative assumption used to derive Cox’s result
is given by Paris[36]:
Denseness assumption[36]: For all real values x, y,
z and each ǫ > 0, there are events A, B, C such that
|(A|BCD)− x|, |(B|CD)− y| and |(C|D)− z| are all
less than ǫ.
This assumption might be more motivated than Cox’s
original assumptions, although it does not seem to be
weaker. In response to [20], we developed very weak
assumptions binding the different parts of a system of
events together[4, 5].
Refinability assumption*[4]: In a plausibility
model with a conditional event of plausibility p, it
must be possible to introduce a new subcase B of
a non-false event A with plausibility value p given
to B|A. This means that it should also be possible
to define a new subcase of an event and get a new
model which is equivalent to the original one as long
as no reference is made to the new event. If two new
subcases B and B′ of an event A are defined in this
way, they can be specified to be information indepen-
dent, i.e., B|B′A = B|A, B′|BA = B′|A. For two
plausibility values x, y such that x < S(y), it should
be possible to define two new subcases C, C′ of any
non-false event A such that x = C|A, y = C′|A and
C ∧ C′|A = ⊥.
These augmentations of the model are called refine-
ments. A refinement just introduces an already exist-
ing plausibility value in ’another part’ of the model.
This means that there is no assumption of a ’dense
domain’ or that a given new plausibility value can
be introduced. The motivation for refinability is that
the same cognitive or other process that resulted in a
particular plausibility value for one event can always
be mirrored in another part of the model to produce
the same plausibility value for another event. If this
process introduces an inconsistency, then we feel that
there is a basic shortcoming of the model, and we
should not accept it. We claim that this assumption
is weaker than those referenced above in this section,
and also more motivated. This is the weakest con-
dition we have found that ensures that the auxiliary
functions F , G and S have enough algebraic prop-
erties – associativity, symmetry(i.e., commutativity
for corresponding binary operators) and distributiv-
ity properties of + and · in a ring – to ensure that the
main theorem follows. Somewhat surprisingly, Cox’s
result on rescalability of the plausibility space to stan-
dard probability follows from refinability and the as-
sumptions in section 2 for models that have a finite
number of plausibility values and an ordered plausi-
bility space[4]. Even more surprisingly, the same re-
sult cannot be proved for infinite plausibility spaces
(non-provability follows from a counter-example[5]).
Two responses to this are possible: either more as-
sumptions are required, or the result would not be
right. We choose the second alternative. The reason is
that we want to extend probability to extended prob-
ability, where infinitesimal probability values are al-
lowed. This idea goes back to Adams[2] and has been
found to give a very basic uncertainty management
that seems to incorporate many uncertainty calculi as
special cases (several are analyzed using extended but
not necessarily Bayesian probability in [7]). The com-
bination of robust and extended probability has been
analyzed by Wilson[50]. Our motivation for accepting
extended probability is the existence of infinite plausi-
bility models that are refinable and embedded in the
real numbers, but whose plausibility spaces are not
rescalable to standard probability[5].
In order to derive extended probability as a canonical
plausibility space, we must assume that models can
be refined to the limit:
Closedness assumption*[5]: The functions F , S
and G have the following additional properties:
F : D ×D → D,
S : D → D,
E = {(x, y) ∈ D ×D : x ≤ S(y)} and G : E → D.
In other words, the functions F and S are total while
G(x, y) is defined when x ≤ S(y). This requirement
is similar (but not equivalent) to Kolmogorov’s in-
sistence that a probability space is defined on a σ-
algebra. Refinability would imply that F and G must
be associative and symmetric, and also that F must
distribute overG on the domain of plausibilities (since
G is a partial function, we must moderate its laws by
only requiring that both sides of its associativity and
symmetry equations are equal when one of them has a
defined value). These algebraic properties will simply
be inherited from the corresponding properties of ∧
and ∨. We can now see that Definition 1 of a proper
ordered plausibility space is relevant in the sense that
we must work with such spaces if we accept the gen-
eral framework of section 2, and if we also accept the
refinability and closedness assumptions. If we accept
the Robustness assumption we can concentrate on or-
dered spaces.
Definition 1 A proper plausibility space is a
seven-tuple (D,F,G, S,≤,⊥,⊤), where D is a par-
tially ordered domain with smallest value ⊥ and
largest value ⊤, F : D × D → D, S : D → D,
E = {(x, y) ∈ D × D : x < S(y)} and G : E → D.
Moreover, F and G are symmetric and associative, F
distributes over G, F and G are increasing in their ar-
guments and S is decreasing. Additionally, G(x,⊥) =
x, F (⊥, x) = ⊥, F (x,⊤) = x, S(S(x)) = x, and
S(⊥) = ⊤. A proper ordered plausibility space
is a proper plausibility space where ≤ is a total order-
ing.
Theorem 1 A proper ordered plausibility space can
be uniquely embedded in a minimal ordered field where
multiplication and addition are extensions of F and
G, respectively.
Proof. See appendix.
Theorem 2 Assume that a plausibility model and its
plausibility space satisfies the assumptions of Suffi-
ciency, Monotonicity, Propositional limit, Refinabil-
ity and Closedness. Then the plausibility space is a
proper plausibility space.
Proof. See appendix.
We can now see that Theorem 2 leads us to concen-
trate on proper plausibility spaces, and that with the
Robustness assumption Claim 1 should follow from
Theorem 1.
5 Common sense assumptions entail
extended robust probability.
The best known ordered fields are Q and R. How-
ever, there are ordered fields that contain more than
the real numbers. One example is the field of ra-
tional functions R(ǫ) in one variable ǫ. These func-
tions can be added to and multiplied with each other,
and if they are ranked by the lexicographical order-
ing of their values and derivatives of order 1, 2, ... at
ǫ = 0, we get an ordered field. This field contains all
real numbers (as constant functions) but does not ad-
mit lowest upper and greatest lower bounds, and thus
cannot be embedded in the field of reals. The vari-
able ǫ can be regarded as an infinitesimal, positive
but smaller than every positive real number. There
are many ordered fields that are superfields of the re-
als, and there is even a unique maximal ordered field
No, described by Conway[12]. This field consists of
reals, infinite numbers and infinitesimals. There is
an infinitesimal element (a non-zero element smaller
than every real number) for every infinite ordinal and
transfinite number, namely its inverse. The field No
has an extremely complex structure and cannot be
easily represented in a computer. The concepts of
infinitesimals and infinite numbers in non-standard
analysis[40] are closely related to extended probabil-
ity. However, non-standard analysis has a set-model-
theoretic basis whereas our basis is classical algebra,
and it is not completely obvious that the two concepts
are exactly identical.
The above leads us to a belief structure where belief
is an extended probability value. Many arguments
have been forwarded for belief to be modeled not by
an ordered set, but a partially ordered set like a set
of intervals. Because of the subtle properties of be-
lief, it is difficult to resolve what the right thing is
in a convincing way. The preceding analysis started
out with the assumption that belief values are totally
ordered, and cannot get to other conclusions. How-
ever, assume that the possible plausibility values form
a partially ordered set, and accept the Robustness as-
sumption of section 2. This partially ordered set can
then be regarded as a set of different contexts (e.g.,
different unfused expert assessments) of linearly or-
dered plausibility models. For each linearly ordered
domain belonging to an indexed member , Theorem 1
is applicable, and thus a plausibility model can be
fully characterized by a set of extended probability
distributions, one for each index. One way to fuse
such sets of distributions is to form a weighted av-
erage of the distributions, but it is not clear which
principles such fusion should be based on.
6 Pragmatics
If we design a methodology where users are permitted
to define epistemic states as sets of extended proba-
bility distributions we will soon find us in a situation
where these users are encouraged to define things they
cannot possibly understand. Extended Robust Bayes
allows us to construct extremely complex descriptions
of systems, where instead of points we must work
with polytopes in high-dimensional or even infinite-
dimensional spaces. Even simple things cannot easily
be done with such models[3]. The most interesting as-
pect of the above analysis is that it indicates a possible
maximal generality in uncertainty management, but
in every particular application this generality must
probably be pruned. Is the full generality really re-
quired? There are strong claims in the literature that
it is not. There are also strong claims that conven-
tional Bayesianism, where only one probability distri-
bution is used and where probabilities are standard,
is inadequate. So, a pragmatic approach would be to
investigate claims made, and see how reasonable they
are. In this investigation there seems no definite need
to distinguish human from machine decision making –
most requirements we find are obviously applicable to
human and machine alike, particularly when we want
machines to interact with humans in terms of beliefs
and intentions.
6.1 Extended Probability
Is extended probability needed or is standard prob-
ability adequate? Extended probability is not com-
pletely unavoidable, in the sense that every finite
extended probability model is equivalent to a stan-
dard probability model[4]. But in some cases ex-
tended probability seems useful as a pragmatic sim-
plification of a modeling problem and obtaining natu-
ral problem descriptions. It seems clear that there
is a phase in cognitive assessments where qualita-
tive and order-of-magnitude reasoning is done[26], fol-
lowed by a quantitative phase where more quantita-
tive reasoning occurs. In AI reasoning research, many
non-probabilistic methods have been proposed, and it
seems as if many of them can be described in terms
of extended probability[7, 8]. Non-standard analysis
approaches have been advocated as an alternative to
measure-theoretic ones in stochastic processes. Al-
though no immediate reaction followed from the user
communities, this is still a promising direction[34]. A
number of assumptions have been proposed in the lit-
erature for arriving at the inevitability of standard
probability and thus the exclusion of extended prob-
ability:
Real valued assumption: Assume (with, e.g, Cox)
that plausibility is real valued.
Archimedean assumption: Fine[17] assumes that
for every non-zero probability e, with ne = G((n −
1)e, e) and 1·e = e, there is anN such thatNe > S(e).
This assumption is introduced to step from compara-
tive to standard probability.
Separability assumption: Arnborg and Sjo¨din[5]
define a separable model as one in which, for every x <
y and c, there are n, m such that xn < cm < yn, with
xn = F (x, xn−1) and x1 = x. This is introduced as
a weaker assumption than continuity of the auxiliary
function F introduced in [1].
With the hindsight given by Theorem 1, these as-
sumptions appear only as alternative ways to say that
we do not accept infinitesimal probabilities. None of
these assumptions are very compelling except possibly
the first, if plausibility values are used in an applica-
tion strictly using expected utility decision making.
In this case plausibilities separated by an infinitesi-
mal amount cannot be distinguished and can be con-
sidered equivalent.
7 Summary and Conclusions
Many of the objections to Bayesian methods come
from the sometimes very complex analytical models
preferred by theoretical statisticians, and many prac-
titioners have seen alternative methods like neural
networks as a way to by-pass statistics. Unfortunately
(or fortunately) this is to a large extent an illusion.
There is no principled reason why models used could
not be based on other types of models like neural net-
works, linguistic coding or case based reasoning, and
indeed efforts have been made to view these tech-
niques as special types of Bayesian models[23, 38].
As detailed above, there is no simple way around
the normative claims of the Robust Extended Bayes’
method. So if one uses an alternative method, it will
sooner or later have to be evaluated against the stan-
dard scale of rationality. Bayesian methods contain a
large amount of freedom in the sense that there are
no ’correct’ models or model sets on which to base
conclusions about real world or inner world phenom-
ena, but models must be chosen and tested against
requirements of applications. This makes the Robust
Extended Bayesian method itself more or less impos-
sible to falsify - but so are other very basic methods
like arithmetic.
Is it now possible to answer the question in the ti-
tle of this paper? Even a subjectivistic probabilist
would hesitate, but mainly because the question is a
little ambiguous. Our answer is that extended robust
probability is completely plausible as a universal un-
certainty or belief measure until an example is given
where some of the starred assumptions above can be
demonstrated dubious.
Acknowledgments
The reviewers of previous versions of this contribution
have influenced it significantly, by pointing out ques-
tionable statements (some now deleted, others elab-
orated) and several relevant related papers in many
disciplines.
SA is indebted to David Draper for discussions of the
importance of and approach to including countable
additivity in the Cox/Jaynes framework, which also
made me finalize this unpublished manuscript and
add a retrospective section below (after the bibliogra-
phy).
References
[1] J. Acze´l. Lectures on Functional Equations and
their Applications. Academic Press, 1966.
[2] E. Adams. Probability and the logic of condi-
tionals. In J. Hintikka and P. Suppes, editors,
Aspects of Inductive Logic, pages 265–316. North
Holland, Amsterdam, 1966.
[3] S. Arnborg. Learning in prevision space. In
Gert de Cooman, Fabio G. Cozman, Serafin
Moral, and Peter Walley, editors, Proceedings of
the First International Symposium on Imprecise
Probabilities and their Applications, pages 8–14.
Gent University, 1999.
[4] S. Arnborg and G. Sjo¨din. Bayes rules in finite
models. In Proc. European Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence, pages 571–575, Berlin, 2000.
[5] S. Arnborg and G. Sjo¨din. On the foundations
of Bayesianism. In Ali Mohammad-Djarafi, ed-
itor, Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy
Methods in Science and Engineering, 20th Inter-
national Workshop, Gif-sur-Yvette, 2000, pages
61–71. American Institute of Physics, 2001.
[6] Stefan Arnborg. Robust Bayesianism: Relation
to evidence theory. Journal of Advances in In-
formation Fusion, 2006.
[7] S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, and H. Prade. Non-
monotonic reasoning, conditional objects and
possibility theory. Artificial Intelligence, 92:259–
276, 1997.
[8] S. Benferhat, A. Saffiotti, and P. Smets. Belief
functions and default reasoning. Artificial Intel-
ligence, 122:1–69, 2000.
[9] Jose M. Bernardo and Adrian F. Smith. Bayesian
Theory. Wiley, 1994.
[10] G. Birkhoff. Subdirect unions in universal alge-
bra. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 50, 1944.
[11] Andrzej K. Brodzik and Robert H. Enders.
A case of combination of evidence in the
Dempster-Shafer theory inconsistent with eval-
uation of probabilities. 2011. arXiv:1107.0082v1
[math.PR].
[12] J.H. Conway. On Numbers and Games. Aca-
demic Press, 1976.
[13] R.T. Cox. Probability, frequency, and reasonable
expectation. Am. Jour. Phys., 14:1–13, 1946.
[14] D. de Brucq, O. Colot, and A.Sombo. Identical
foundation of probability theory and fuzzy set
theory. In FUSION 2002, pages 1442–1449. In-
ternational Society of Information Fusion, 2002.
[15] B. de Finetti. Theory of Probability. Lon-
don:Wiley, 1974.
[16] A.P. Dempster. Upper and lower probabilities
induced by a multi-valued mapping. Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, 38:325–339, 1967.
[17] T. L. Fine. Theories of Probability. Academic
Press, 1973.
[18] Andrew Gelman. The Boxer, the Wrestler, and
the Coin Flip: A paradox of robust Bayesian
inference and belief functions. The American
Statistician, 2006.
[19] I. Goodman, H.T. Nguyen, and G. Rogers. On
the scoring approach to admissibility of uncer-
tainty measures in expert systems. J. Math.
Analysis Appl., 159:550–594, 1991.
[20] J. Halpern. A counterexample to theorems of
Cox and Fine. Journal of AI research, 10:67–85,
1999.
[21] J. Halpern. Cox’s theorem revisited. Journal of
AI research, 11:429–435, 1999.
[22] M. Hardy. Scaled boolean algebras. Advances in
Applied Mathematics, 29:243–292, 2002.
[23] E. Hu¨llermeier. Toward a probabilistic formaliza-
tion of case-based inference. In D. Thomas, ed-
itor, Proceedings of the 16th International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99-
Vol1), pages 248–253, S.F., July 31–August 6
1999. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
[24] D.S. Hutchinson. Ethics. In P. Barnes, editor,
Aristotle, Cambridge, 1995. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
[25] E.T. Jaynes. Probability Theory: The Logic of
Science. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
[26] G. A. Klein. Recognition-primed decisions. In
W. Rouse, editor, Advances in Man-Machine sys-
tems research, pages 47–92, Greenwich, 1989.
JAI Press.
[27] C.H. Kraft, J.W. Pratt, and A. Seidenberg. Intu-
itive probability on finite sets. Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics, 30:408–419, 1959.
[28] D. V. Lindley. Bayesian Statistics: a Review.
SIAM, 1971.
[29] D. V. Lindley. Scoring rules and the inevitability
of probability (with discussion). Internat. Stat.
Rev, 50:1–26, 1982.
[30] S. MacLane and G. Birkhoff. Algebra. The
MacMillan Company, New York, 1967.
[31] Neal H. McCoy. Subdirect sums of rings. Bull.
Amer. Math. Soc., 53, 1947.
[32] N.H. McCoy. Subrings of direct sums. Amer. J.
Math., 60, 1938.
[33] N.H. McCoy. Theory of Rings. McMillan Com-
pany, 1964.
[34] E. Nelson. Radically Elementary Probability The-
ory. Princeton University Press, 1987.
[35] John D. Norton. Probability disassembled.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
2007.
[36] J.B. Paris. The Uncertain Reasoner’s Compan-
ion. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
[37] Z. Pawlak. Rough Sets. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992.
[38] B. Ripley. Pattern Recognition and Neural Net-
works. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[39] J. Robins and L. Wasserman. Conditioning, like-
lihood and coherence: A review of some foun-
dational concepts. J. American Statistical Ass.,
95:1340–1345, 2000.
[40] A. Robinson. Introduction to Model Theory
and to the Metamathematics of Algebra. North-
Holland, 1963.
[41] L.J. Savage. Foundations of Statistics. John Wi-
ley & Sons, New York, 1954.
[42] Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane. Probability
disassembled. Z Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, 66,
1984.
[43] Niels Schwartz. Convex extensions of partially
ordered rings. In Ge´ome´trie alge´brique et analy-
tique re´elle, 2004.
[44] G. Shafer. A mathematical theory of evidence.
Princeton University Press, 1976.
[45] G Shafer and V. Vovk. Probability Theory – it’s
only a Game. MIT Press, 2001.
[46] R. Smith. Logic. In P. Barnes, editor, Aristotle,
Cambridge, 1995. Cambridge University Press.
[47] P. Snow. The vulnerability of the transferable be-
lief model to Dutch books. Artificial Intelligence,
105:345–354, 1998.
[48] Alexander Terenin and David Draper. Rigoriz-
ing and Extending the Cox-Jaynes Derivation of
Probability: Implications for Statistical Practice.
2015. arXiv:1507.06597 [math.ST].
[49] P. Walley. Measures of uncertainty in expert sys-
tems. Artificial Intelligence, 83:1–58, 1996.
[50] N. Wilson. A logic of extended probability.
In Gert de Cooman, Fabio G. Cozman, Serafin
Moral, and Peter Walley, editors, Proceedings of
the First International Symposium on Imprecise
Probabilities and their Applications, pages 397–
404. Gent University, 1999.
[51] L. A. Zadeh. The roles of fuzzy logic and soft
computing in the conception, design and deploy-
ment of intelligent systems. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 1198:183–210, 1997.
[52] Jo¨rg Zimmermann. Algebraic uncertainty the-
ory. Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t
Bonn, 2012. PhD Thesis.
8 Retrospect
Various versions of this manuscript were accidentally
indexed by search engines and are cited by other pa-
pers. This is the last 2003 version, with very few
changes made in 2015: typos removed and a few
too short arguments elaborated. Nothing reflecting
developments since 2003 has been added, except in
this retrospective section. Several aspects of possi-
ble polishing of Cox/Jaynes’s development have been
published, for a survey see the introductory sections
of [48]. Apparently, little effort has been spent on
analysing extended probability and partially ordered
plausibility domains, but there are a few results to re-
view. I will only mention those results easily discussed
in our algebraic framework. Some papers argue that
we have made above quite a number of assumptions
compared to other papers in the same area. But this
is, on closer reading, only an effect of our need to be
explicit about assumptions and to discuss several al-
ternative assumption sets. Counting assumptions as
axioms is a bit misleading since we actually want com-
pelling axioms, not minimum number of them. The
shortest axiom set would be our Claim above...
8.1 Countable additivity
In the paper by Terenin and Draper[48], a new aspect
is taken up, namely countable additivity of probabil-
ities which has several equivalent definitions, the one
coupled to its name is that for all events C and all
sets of mutually disjoint events {Ei}, we must have
ΣiP (Ei|C) = P (
⋂
i Ei|C). Yosida and Hewitt, how-
ever, define countable additivity as the condition that
for every event C and sequence (Ai) such that Ai+1 ⊂
Ai and
⋂
iAi = ∅, we also have limi P (Ai|C) = 0, and
they claim it trivially equivalent to the former defi-
nition. The latter seems more understandable than
the first, and could possibly serve as a ’compelling
assumption’ in the Cox/Jaynes framework, as is ap-
proximately the case in [48].
Although one normally, in applications where the
question arises, just assumes or postulates that this
assumption is fulfilled (as among others Kolmogorov
did), it actually does not have to be true for infinite
sets of events (but it must be true when {Ei} is a finite
set, a property called finite additivity), this being a
consequence of somewhat counter-intuitive measure-
theoretic considerations. A simple example of a prob-
ability distribution violating countable additivity is
obtained by starting with a uniform distribution over
integers 1 to N and letting N go to ∞. Then every
probability of an integer goes to 0 but all the sums are
1. The limit of the sums is thus 1 while the sum of
the limits is 0. One common way to handle this is to
claim that the limit, an improper prior, is not a proba-
bility distribution, despite the fact that unnormalized
improper priors are sometimes (actually, quite often)
used ’as if’ they can be normalized. If the likelihood is
enough concentrated, the posterior obtained by apply-
ing Bayes rule can be normalized and thus gives an in-
ference, although it is clear that there are some prob-
lems with this approach. An improper prior, how-
ever, contains more significant information than the
normalized finitely additive probability distribution,
as can be seen in that the standard improper priors
(uniform, Jeffrey’s, etc) are identical as probability
distributions: they all have density zero (except, for
Jeffrey’s prior, at zero). However, in the framework
of extended probability they are proper distributions
with infinitesimal densities. The question whether
probabilities in infinite spaces should be countably or
just finitely additive has been debated a lot, while in
most applications one just assumes, with Kolmogorov,
countable additivity. The Cox/Jaynes framework is
explicitly based on what Jaynes refers to as common
sense, but the question of countable/finite additiv-
ity has not previously (before Terenin and Draper)
been analysed within this framework. Both Cox and
Jaynes most likely regarded this as a non-issue, and
for non-parametric Bayesian inference it is clear that
current practice is based on the assumption of count-
ably additive probability. Considering the current
situation, we have here a case were researchers have
not quite agreed about what common sense requires.
From an engineering perspective the most difficult
to swallow property of spaces not fulfilling count-
able additivity is known as non-conglomerability (de
Finetti[15]). Non-conglomerability can be defined in
terms of plausibilities: For an infinite partition {Ei}
of E and an event C, it is not necessarily the case
that infi C|Ei ≤ C|E ≤ supiC|Ei. Although my own
reaction to this, both immediately and after consid-
erable reflecting over it, is that non-conglomerability
is absurd and must be rejected, the analyses of con-
sequences of non-conglomerability are sometimes just
mentioning that the concept invalidates some famil-
iar inference methods. For example, it is not per-
mitted to conclude that C|E is a weighted average of
the C|Ei for an infinite partition {Ei} of E, in other
words among the C|Ei we will not necessarily find
both numbers not less than and numbers not greater
than C|E. Is my reaction to this a sound reaction or
just unwillingness to change habits?
If non-conglomerability is rejected and conglomerabil-
ity is accepted as a common sense assumption, we can
only end up with a system of plausibilities that can
be rescaled to a system of probabilities that has to be
conglomerable. Although it is relatively easy to see
that a countably additive probability space is con-
glomerable, the reverse is also true but not so easy to
see: a conglomerable probability space is countably
additive. This was proved in [42], so conglomerability
entails countable additivity, at least for real valued
probability systems. This is an alternative axiom to
that presented in [48], maybe also more compelling.
What happens in extended probability has to be in-
vestigated, since the existing derivation relies in many
places on standard probability, where, for example,
least upper bounds exist.
8.2 Partially ordered domains and
robustness
Concerning partially ordered plausibility domains, lit-
tle progress has been made. However, Jo¨rg Zimmer-
mann in his thesis [52] shows that a partially ordered
plausibility space is embeddable in a partially ordered
ring, and shows, assuming that this ring has a great-
est ordered subfield called backbone (and satisfies ad-
ditional technical constraints), that any plausibility
value r can be uniquely decomposed into s + a · t,
where s and t are from the backbone and a is interac-
tive, which means that a is incomparable to elements
between 0 and 1. He also shows that DS-theory is in-
terpretable in this way and clearly robust probability
also fits the model. In robust probability the plausi-
bility domain is a vector (or indexed set) of probabil-
ities and the backbone elements have all components
equal. The domain is a ring, not a field, since it has
zero divisors. The interpretation of the decomposi-
tion here is that s is an estimator of the probabil-
ity (actually the min probability), t is a measure of
the ’uncertainty of the probability’ (maybe s + t/2
is a better estimator of the probability), and a gives
a kind of ’profile’ characterizing the deviation of the
uncertainty from the estimated probability. This is
quite nice, but the assignment of the estimate to ev-
ery plausibility in the model does not itself give a
coherent probability assignment. It is also not clear
that the mentioned subfield always exists and thus a
general understanding of partially ordered plausibil-
ity has not yet been obtained, in particular we do not
know what weight the robustness assumption carries.
Zimmermann, in his ring theorem, clearly makes an
assumption slightly stronger than we have done, in the
axiom And2. This entails the cancellability law for
+ of a ring, and we did (probably) not make enough
assumptions to get cancellability. His assumption is
clever and plausible, how compelling it is I cannot
yet quite see. We could prove cancellability for G
only for totally ordered plausibility domains. With-
out some type of cancellability assumption it is diffi-
cult to characterize the possible plausibility domains,
and in particular to develop the algebraic approach.
Even with the assumption it is difficult to get a real
grip on what the most general such domains mean
in practical terms. Ring structures are quite flexi-
ble. There is a fair number of in-depth treatments of
partially ordered rings, the more recent motivated by
its relevance to real algebraic geometry, but as far as
I know they have not yet been seriously applied to
the philosophical study of plausibility. It seems as if
Zimmermann’s assumption (And2) is a good starting
point, and by his ring theorem the plausibility do-
main is then a partially ordered ring. He calls rings
suitable for plausibility calculus c-rings. Now, the c-
ring does not have to contain a field (the backbone)
under assumptions made, since the ring of integers is
a counterexample, and powers (repeated products) of
this ring are others. But if there is a (non-integer)
rational number (a rational number is a ring element
f such that the n-fold sum of f :s equals m for some
integers n and m) in the c-ring it must also contain
lots of rational numbers since the ring is closed un-
der addition, subtraction and multiplication and this
subring of rationals seems a good approximation to a
field, the backbone. Moreover, any ordered field can
be added to any partially ordered ring, creating a c-
ring with a backbone from a c-ring without one. So
the decomposition theorem of Zimmermann holds for
all c-rings, even if some c-rings may not have inter-
esting decompositions. A second question raised by
the referenced thesis is the structure of c-rings. Our
robustness assumption can also be formulated as a
conjecture:
Conjecture: Every c-ring is embeddable in a prod-
uct of ordered fields.
Considering the intense studies made of rings and
fields, one would expect the literature to contain the
verdict on this conjecture. And it seems to do, but
the standard algebraic operating procedures makes it
more appropriate to say that every c-ring is a subdi-
rect sum of fields:
8.2.1 Representing rings as subdirect sums
The problem of representing a complicated ring as a
product of simpler rings has been thoroughly studied
in [10] and [32, 31, 33]. A product ring P = S × T
of two rings S and T has a carrier that is the Carte-
sian product of those of the factors S and T , and
the operations are defined component-wise, thus, for
example, if S contains s1 and s2 and T contains
t1 and t2, then P contains (si, tj) for i = 1, 2 and
j = 1, 2. Moreover, (s1, t1) · (s2, t2) = (s1 · t1, s2 · t2)
and (s1, t1) + (s2, t2) = (s1 + t1, s2 + t2). Two ob-
servations: for some, probably historical, reason, our
main tool is actually a product but is called subdirect
sum. Another important thing to note is that the
product construction always introduces zero divisors,
so the product of two integral domains is never itself
an integral domain: (s, 0) · (0, t) = (0, 0) regardless of
s and t, and (0, 0) is the zero element of the product
P since it is the unit for +. Therefore, a cancellation
law for · never holds in a product or subdirect sum.
By a subdirect sum S of rings {Si}i∈I (where the index
set I is not necessarily finite or countable) we mean a
ring isomorphic to a subring P of
∏
i∈I Si, and such
that the projection of P on component i is exactly
Si (i.e., the homomorphism is onto). Moreover, we
require the representation to be non-trivial, i.e., none
of the subrings Si is allowed to be isomorphic to P .
If such a non-trivial representation exists, the ring is
called reducible. If no such representation exists, the
ring is irreducible. Note that an irreducible ring is
not the same as a reduced ring; the former can not be
split into a subdirect sum whereas a reduced ring is a
ring that has no nilpotent elements.
Theorem: [10] Every reducible ring is a subdirect
sum of irreducible rings.
What makes this relatively simple theorem interesting
is the connection to fields :
Theorem[33, Theorem 3.14] Every subdirectly irre-
ducible ring with no nilpotent elements is a field.
This is as close as we can get using the literature on
rings to deriving the robustness assumption (In [32,
Theorem 4], the corresponding statement was that
every reduced (in the sense of absence of nilpotent
elements) and reducible ring is a subdirect sum of
integral domains, a slightly weaker result). The ques-
tion now is: is there some good argument to reject
factors in the subdirect sum with nilpotent elements,
which would recover the robustness conjecture? Yes,
there is. If a factor in a subdirect sum P has a nilpo-
tent element then P also has a nilpotent element and
there is a nilpotent element in the plausibility domain:
If Si has the nilpotent element a, then the product
has the nilpotent element (0, . . . , 0, a, 0, . . . , 0) with
only one non-zero component. If there is a nilpo-
tent plausibility value then there is also a 6= 0 such
that a2 = 0. Use the refinement assumption to de-
fine two new subevents B1 and B2 of A such that
B1|A = B2|A = a and such that they are information
independent: B2|B1A = a. Now B1 and B2 are both
possible (a 6= 0) in the context of A, but their combi-
nation in the context A has plausibility a2 = 0 and is
impossible. This contradicts the assumption that the
events are information independent: since B2 is pos-
sible in the context A and information independent of
B1, it should also be possible in the context AB1. We
conclude that the ring is reduced, i.e., lacks nilpotent
elements. Since the decomposition of a reduced ring
will result in a subdirect sum of fields, and these will
be partially ordered by assumption, we can use the
fact([43]) that a partially ordered field can always be
totally ordered and thus is isomorphic to one of the
fields between Q and No, to recover the robustness
conjecture.
We have just informally proved:
Robustness Theorem: A plausibility calculus em-
beddable in a partially ordered ring is, under the refin-
ability assumption, equivalent to a subring of a power
NoX , for some set X . The domain of this calculus
is the set of maps from X to subfields of No and the
operations · and + are defined component-wise using
the corresponding field operations.
The question remains of course how this set of prob-
ability assignments should be interpreted. Since the
domain is a direct sum of ordered fields, there is only
one partial order to choose, where a ≥ b if and only if
ai ≥ bi for all i ∈ X .
The assumption is that event A is more plausible than
B if each distribution in the index set says that A is
more plausible than B. Our assumptions do not let
us conclude that the lower and upper envelopes have
the specific meaning of lower and upper limits of an
unknown probability distribution, although this inter-
pretation is done in robust Bayesian inference. How-
ever, the domain values having all components equal
represent obviously precise probabilities (as well as
the backbone of [52]) and an event B with imprecise
probability (not all components equal) is more plau-
sible than an event A with precise plausibility if every
component of B is more plausible than A, and thus
an upper and by symmetry lower plausibility is in-
dicated for the maximum and minimum components
plausibilities. The robust Bayesian interpretation of
domain values is thus justified, and Zimmermann’s
decomposition p = s+ a · t contains indeed the lower
and upper probabilities of p, namely s and s+t. There
is a small complication in that sets of extended prob-
abilities are sets of hyperreal numbers which do not
necessarily have tight lower and upper bounds. The
standard way to define infemum and supremum of
such sets is to use the standard part of the numbers,
although we have not investigated the appropriateness
of this method in this particular application.
8.2.2 Robustness examples
Since the robust Bayesian representation seems uni-
versal one can ask why there are other uncertainty
management schemes than robust Bayesian analysis,
or rather how these fare with respect to the Robust-
ness theorem. The robustness theorem says that a
problem where uncertainty is present should be mod-
eled with a set of conditional probability assignments,
and that these have the interpretation of possible
probability distributions. This seems in agreement
with how robust Bayesian analysis is performed and
interpreted. Zimmerman considers also other uncer-
tainty management schemes, and observes that the
system of lower probabilities violates his ring theo-
rem. This is because lower and upper probabilities
are insufficient for recovering a set of distributions:
in the lower and upper envelopes of a set of distribu-
tions the latter are mixed up and there is no way to
recover the set of distributions from which the upper
and lower probabilities were generated. This has the
consequence that the calculus cannot be embedded in
a ring and there is no useful definition of conditional
plausibility. This appears as a weakness or at least
inconvenience of the method.
A third method, probably the most serious competi-
tor besides Bayes, is Dempster-Shafer evidence the-
ory, DS-theory[16, 44]. Here, an assessment is de-
scribed as a ’body of evidence’ or mass assignment,
and this is a random set over the frame of discern-
ment Ω which in turn is a partition of the universe of
discourse. A generative model of the outcome given a
body of evidence is that an outcome of the random set
is generated and then one member of the resulting set
is chosen arbitrarily. If the random set has non-zero
probability only for singleton sets there is no arbitrary
choice and we have a precise Bayesian probability
model. Zimmerman observes that a body of evidence
can be translated to a set of distributions and this is
a good beginning. However, the DS-theory also has
the peculiarity that bodies of evidence that are inde-
pendent (of which apparently no precise characteriza-
tion has been given) should be combined with random
set intersection (conditioned on being nonempty), the
Dempster’s rule. Dempster’s rule is different from the
robust Bayesian combination rule. A very useful ex-
ample of the difference was presented by Gelman[18]:
it involves a match between a boxer and a wrestler,
the outcome of which is entirely uncertain, and a coin
flip which is a standard random event with probability
0.5 for each outcome. Here the events are: B: boxer
wins; B: wrestler wins; C: heads up; C: tails up.
The frame of discernment is Ω = {BC,BC,BC,BC}.
The total uncertainty of B is expressed with the vac-
uous mass assignment [m1({BC,BC,BC,BC}) = 1],
a random set whose outcome is always Ω. The in-
formation on the coin flip is expressed by the body
of evidence [m2({BC,BC}) = 0.5;m2{BC,BC}) =
0.5)], a random set whose outcome is {BC,BC}
or {BC,BC}, each with probability 0.5. Gelman
now goes on and adds the evidence that an im-
partial and trustworthy person reports that the two
events had identical outcome (either BC or BC hap-
pened) This can be encoded as the body of evidence
[m3({BC,BC}) = 1]. Combining, using Depster’s
rule, the bodies of evidence m1, m2 and m3, gives
the random set [m({BC}) = 0.5;m({BC}) = 0.5),
in other words the outcome is that of the standard
coin flip. On the other hand, if the bodies of evidence
are translated to sets of distributions and combined
using Laplace’s combination (component-wise multi-
plication followed by normalization), the outcome is
completely uncertain between BC and BC, in other
words [mr({BC,BC}) = 1], the random set outcome
is always {BC,BC} . There is a significant practi-
cal difference between these two results: In the first
case any bet on the outcome at better than even odds
is known to be advantageous, in the second case no
bets or odds are known to be advantageous. And it
is not difficult to see, by considering probabilities for
B close to 0 and 1, that in this simple example the
robust Bayesian method is the appropriate one. Gel-
man is dissatisfied with both results, but the robust
Bayesian method actually gives the right result in this
simple example, the difficulty seems to be in the prob-
lem formulation. Dempster’s rule gives no imprecision
when an imprecise body of evidence is combined with
a precise one (which, as mentioned, is characterized
by being a singleton random set). This is a trivial
consequence of the random set intersection in Demp-
ster’s rule: the intersection of a singleton random set
with any random set is itself a singleton or empty.
It is possible to bring in DS-theory under the ro-
bust Bayesian methodology, but only by modelling
the random set operations directly – they are after
all entirely kosher probability models. This would
entail introduction of new symbols for the subsets
of Ω. These symbols are new and do not corre-
spond to unions or intersections but to the random
sets involved, so for example the symbol E = {BC}
gives rise to the assignments E|m1 = 0, E|m2 = 0,
E|m3 = 0 and E|m = 0.5, whereas the correct answer
based on [mr({BC,BC}) = 1] would have E|mr = 0
but F |mr = 1 where F = {BC,BC}. This gives
a precise Bayesian model where only the last step,
translating the final random set to a convex set of
probabilities, uses the robust Bayesian framework.
The problem is thus not that DS-theory does not fit
into the Cox/Jaynes framework, but that the implied
probability model sometimes (like in Gelman’s case)
gives wrong answers for simple problems, as has been
pointed out in [6, 11]. The discussion of the justifi-
cation of Dempster’s rule in [16] seems fair, but the
problem is that the implied probability model is only
known to be appropriate for problems where impreci-
sion can be attributed to private frames of reference.
8.3 Philosophy
A number of philosophical papers on the justifications
of the line of investigations based on Cox’s and de
Finetti’s work have also appeared. An article by John
D Norton[35] groups assumptions in several groups,
gives counterarguments to some of them, and sug-
gests that each group is checked and a subset is cho-
sen according to the needs of each specific application.
This seems a reasonable idea, but it requires a lot of
effort to find out what these subsets actually mean
in terms of the ensuing uncertainty calculi, and my
experience is that finding the specific needs in an ap-
plication area is difficult, since as Norton points out
the game is really to find convincing arguments for an
already made decision. In practice it seems that, cur-
rently, a number of methods are developed in separate
communities and one of their major tasks (given that
the claim to universality is too difficult as they usually
know by now) is to find the applications that confirm
the method. The conclusion of Norton is quite plau-
sible while his specific examples in the argumentation
are sometimes difficult to follow and agree with, like
the lack of distinction between descriptive (Cialdini,
Ellsberg, Kahneman, Tversky, Klein) and prescrip-
tive studies. As an example, the non-associativity
of the ’more plausible than’ relation occurs only in
descriptive studies (reflecting framing, cognitive bar-
riers, unstable preferences or approximate computa-
tions) and there is no real argument against it in a
prescriptive system. When and if a difference is found
it seems that three lines of investigation are possible:
(i) explaining the difference, for example by the wiring
of the brain, the social context of the decision mak-
ing, computational or cognitive limitations, or a real
problem with the prescription; (ii) explaining what is
wrong in practical decision making and trying to fix it
by adjusting the education system; (iii) finding what
is wrong with the prescriptive theories and adapting
them to the real needs or finding a new prescriptive
theory of some generality if not universality. It seems
to me that accepting (iii) as the only appropriate way
is not so convincing. The development of Bayesian
analysis is however an example of the third option:
from being harshly criticised most of the time be-
fore 1980, it has been tuned by an enormous effort by
Bayesians addressing both fundamental and compu-
tational questions as well as developing sophisticated
model families suitable for areas such as health sci-
ences, bioinformatics, language translation, language
and species evolution, robotics and vision, web ana-
lytics, signals and systems and finance, in several of
which it has supplanted earlier methodologies. There
is by now a toolbox that, by its diversity and the
versatility of supporting computer codes, makes the
Bayesian framework rather hard to replace. It is also
not the case that spectacular developments have been
achieved all over the field and certainly some Bayesian
efforts have faded away, but enough remains to make
a convincing case for robust Bayesian analysis as the
starting effort in an area, and in case the application
area is resisting, see what modifications of the method
can be made before looking for completely different al-
ternatives. Such modifications have been made, and
I find it difficult to see many of them as contrived or
exotic.
In summary, it seems that despite progress the last
decade, there is more to find out about plausibility
calculi.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Recall the definition of an ordered field: it is a struc-
ture R = (D,<, ·,+, 1, 0), where D is a domain or-
dered by <, · and + are total functions from D2 to
D, satisfying the properties of associativity and sym-
metry, and where · distributes over +. Moreover, it
has an additive inverse, i.e.,, the equation a + x = b
can be solved for x, and the equation a · x = b can be
solved for x if a 6= 0. The element 1 of D is a unit for
· and 0 is a unit for +. The function + is increasing
and · is increasing for arguments larger (by <) than
0. Fields are special cases of rings and integral do-
mains. An ordered integral domain satisfies the rules
of a field except that we do not require solvability for
x of a · x = b.
We will show how an ordered plausibility space is em-
bedded in an ordered field. We have thus the space
defined by the ordered domain D with smallest and
largest elements now called 0 and 1, respectively, and
they will always be embedded as 0 and 1 of the field,
respectively. Because of the significant number of al-
gebraic formulas used here, we also use infix notation
+ and · for G and F , as well as for their extensions.
The function S : D → D maps its argument x to
a solution - the only one because of the monotonicity
assumption - y of the equation x+y = 1. The function
· is defined on D×D, and + on {(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ D×
D∧x ≤ S(y)}. We now extend D while extending the
definitions of · and +. We know that · is associative
and symmetric, and that + is symmetric. If (a+ b)+
c and a + (b + c) are both defined, they are equal.
Likewise, if a+b is defined, c · (a+b) = c ·a+c ·b, and
if a+ b is defined and c < b, then a+ c is also defined.
The strict monotonicity assumption leads to cancel-
lation properties:
Lemma 1 If a+ b = a+ c then b = c, if a · b = a · c
and a 6= 0 then b = c, if a+ b ≤ a+ c then b ≤ c, and
if a · b ≤ a · c and a 6= 0 then b ≤ c.
If there are no elements in D except 0 and 1, the em-
bedding is trivial, so we assume an element e with
0 < e < 1 in D. We do the embedding in three steps,
using the standard technique of defining an extension
as the quotient of a set of pairs by an equivalence re-
lation, and indicating which element of the extension
that corresponds to each element of the original do-
main. We use the notation [a]∼ for the equivalence
class of ∼ containing a. It is easy, in each embedding
step, to define the functions · and + on the exten-
sions and verify that they are indeed functions and
extensions, that their laws are preserved, as well as
to verify that no two elements of the old domain be-
come equivalent in the new domain. Details of this
verification are shown here, in the form of a series of
Lemmas, whose proofs are sometimes terse and some-
times omitted.
Lemma 2 If a1+a2 is defined and a1 ≥ b1 and a2 ≥
b2, then b1 + b2 is defined.
Proof: Obviously, b1 ≤ a1 ≤ S(a2) ≤ S(b2).
Lemma 3 If e 6= 0, 1 and f = min(e, S(e)), then
f · a+ f · b is defined.
Proof: Assume (no loss of generality because of sym-
metry of +) that a ≤ b.
1. f = e ≤ S(e): In this case, f ·a ≤ f · b ≤ S(f) · b,
and f · b + S(f) · b is defined, thus by Lemma 1
f · a+ f · b is also defined.
2. e > S(e) = f : Since e · b+ S(e) · b is defined and
e · b ≥ f · a, thus by Lemma 2 f · a+ f · b is also
defined.
Lemma 4 For every sequence (ai)
n
1 there is a non-
zero cn depending only on n such that cn · a1 + cn ·
a2 . . . cn · an is defined.
Proof: For any non-trivial plausibility value e, choose
c = min(e, S(e)) and cn = c
⌈logn⌉. Use Lemma 3
inductively on half sequences.
The first embedding step introduces non-negative ra-
tionals and is similar to the standard quotient con-
struction for integral domains. Let D+ = D − {⊥}
and D(1) = (D × D+)/ ∼, where, for a, c ∈ D and
b, d ∈ D+, (a, b) ∼ (c, d) iff a · d = b · c. This
makes ∼ an equivalence relation. Use notation [a, b]
for [(a, b)]∼. An element d ∈ D is identified with
[d, 1] ∈ D(1).
Define <, · and + as total functions onD(1) by [a, b] <
[c, d] iff a · d < c · b, [a, b] · [c, d] = [a · c, b · d], and
[a, b]+ [c, d] = [e ·a ·d+ e · c · b, e · b ·d], for some e such
that the expressions are defined (see Lemma A). The
rational number 2/3 is identified with [x+x, x+x+x]
for some 0 < x < c3, and the other non-negative
rationals are similarly defined. In this extension the
rules for a field are satisfied, except that we have not
yet an additive inverse or negative values:
Lemma 5 The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation
and if [d, 1] = [d′, 1], then d = d′.
Proof: The relation ∼ is obviously reflexive and sym-
metric. It is also associative, since if (a, b) ∼ (c, d)
and (c, d) ∼ (e, f) with b, d, f 6= 0 then a ·d = b ·c and
c · f = d · e, hence c 6= 0, a · f · (c · d) = e · b · (c · d) and
by the cancellation Lemma, (a, b) ∼ (e, f).
Lemma 6 The relation < is a total order on D(1).
Proof: Omitted.
Lemma 7 The relations · and + are total functions
on D(1) ×D(1).
Proof: Consider +: If [a, b]+[c, d] = [f, g] and [a′, b′]+
[c, d] = [f ′, g′] with [f, g] = [f ′, g′], then [f, g] = [e · a ·
d+e ·c ·b, e ·b ·d] and [f ′, g′] = [e ·a′ ·d+e ·c ·b′, e ·b′ ·d],
The equivalence condition [f, g] = [f ′, g′] translates to
(e·a·d+e·c·b)·e·b′ ·d = (e·a′ ·d+e·c·b′)·e·b·d, in other
words (by cancellation) (a·d+c·b)·b′ = (a′·d+c·b′)·b so
[a, b] = [a′, b′]. In other words the type of + is indeed
D(1) ×D(1) → D(1). The other cases are similar but
easier.
Lemma 8 The functions · and + are associative and
symmetric, and · distributes over + on D(1) ×D(1).
Proof: Consider associativity for +: If ([a, b]+[c, d])+
[f, g] = [h, i] and [a, b] + ([c, d] + [f, g]) = [h′, i′], then
[h, i] = [e·(e·a·d+e·c·b)·g+e·f ·e·b·d, e·e·b·d·g] and
[h′, i′] = [e ·(e ·c ·g+e ·d ·f) ·b+e ·a ·d ·g ·e, e ·b ·e ·d ·g].
These two are equal. The other cases are similar.
Our next embedding step introduces subtraction and
negative values: Let D(2) = (D(1)×(D(1))/ ≈, where,
for a, b, c, d ∈ D(1), (a, b) ≈ (c, d) iff a+d = b+ c. Use
notation [[a, b]] for [(a, b)]≈. An element d ∈ D(1) is
identified with [[d, 0]] ∈ D(2). Define <, · and + in
this extension by [[a, b]] < [[c, d]] iff a + d < c + b,
[[a, b]] · [[c, d]] = [[a · c+ b · d, a · d+ b · c]], and [[a, b]] +
[[c, d]]) = [[a+ c, b+ d]].
Lemma 9 The relation ≈ is an equivalence relation
and if [[d, 0]] = [[d′, 0]], then d = d′.
Lemma 10 The relation < is a total order on D(2)
and extends < on D(1).
Lemma 11 The relations · and + are total functions
on D(2) ×D(2) and extend · and + on D(1) ×D(1).
Lemma 12 The functions · and + are associative,
symmetric and · distributes over + on D(2) ×D(2).
Lemma 13 The structure R = (D(2), <, ·,+, 1, 0) is
an ordered integral domain.
Lemma 14 ([30, Ch V.2, Theorem 6]) Every ordered
integral domain can be embedded in an ordered field
The structure R can thus be embedded in an ordered
field. This field embeds the plausibility space. This
finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Let the plausibility space be (D, ·,+, S,≤,⊥,⊤).
Most of the properties of a proper ordered plausibil-
ity space are immediate consequences of our stated
assumptions. The non-trivial part is to show that the
stated laws for F , G and S must hold in a consistently
refinable model. This follows from a sequence of Lem-
mas, each showing how an algebraic law follows from
the corresponding law of propositional logic. We only
state them and prove some of them:
Lemma 15 For all x ∈ D, S(S(x)) = x.
Proof: If x = A|B, then x = A|B = A|B = S(S(x)).
Lemma 16 For all x, y, z ∈ D, (x ·y) ·z) = x ·(y ·z)).
Proof: If we have worked out a model where a·(b·c) 6=
(a · b) · c for some plausibilities a, b and c that occur
in the model, then we take an arbitrary statement S
(not false) and refine with A′, B′ and C′: A′ → B′,
B′ → C′ and C′ → S, A′|B′ = a, B′|C′ = b and
C′|S = c. Now the value A′B′C′|S can be computed
in two ways giving different results, as (A′B′)C′|S =
F (A′B′|SC′, C′|S) = F (F (A′|B′, B′|C′), c) = (a ·
b) · c and as A′(B′C′)|S = F (A′|SB′C′, B′C′|S) =
F (A′|B′, F (B′|C′, C′|S)) = a · (b · c).
Lemma 17 For all x, y ∈ D, x · y = y · x.
Proof: If x = A|D and y = B|E, introduce by
refinement B′ such that D → B′, B′|D = y and
B′ is independent of A. Now AB′|D = x · y and
AB′|D = B′A|D = y · x, so x · y = y · x.
Lemma 18 For all x, y ∈ D, x + y = y + x, in the
sense that if one side is defined, then the other side is
defined and equal.
Proof: If x = A|D and y = B|E and x ≤ S(y), intro-
duce by refinement B′ such that D → B′, B′|D = y
and AB = ⊥. Now A ∨B|D = x+ y and A ∨B|D =
B ∨A|D = y + x, so x+ y = y + x.
Lemma 19 For all x, y, z ∈ D, (x + y) + z = x +
(y + z), in the sense that if one side is defined, then
the other side is defined and equal.
Proof: By refinement and associativity of ∨.
Lemma 20 For all x, y, z ∈ D, x·z+y ·z = (y+x)·z,
in the sense that if x + y is defined, then both sides
are defined and equal.
Proof: Assume x, y and z are non-trivial plausibili-
ties of the model and x ≤ S(y), because otherwise the
Lemma is obvious. Introduce for non-⊥ D by refine-
ment A→ D, B → D and C → D such that A∧B =
⊥ and A and B are independent of C, and x = A|D,
y = B|D and z = C|D. Now, (A∨B)∧C|D = (x+y)·z
and (A∨B)∧C|D = (A∧C)∨(B∧C)|D = x ·z+y ·z
and the Lemma follows.
